nastyleg
04-01-2010, 05:18 PM
GAO: Weapons face delays, cost hikes
By Lance M. Bacon - Staff writer
Posted : Thursday Apr 1, 2010 10:59:10 EDT
The Government Accountability Office on Tuesday said the Defense Department’s weapon acquisition programs are improving, but remain in danger of cost overruns and delays.
The eighth annual report, titled “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,” examines how well DoD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs. It uses as a backdrop the defense secretary’s fiscal 2010 budget, which recommended canceling or curtailing several programs that were over cost, behind schedule or no longer suited to meet the warfighters’ needs. Such programs included the Air Force’s Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, the Army’s Future Combat System, the Missile Defense Agency’s Multiple Kill Vehicle and the Navy Deoartment’s VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement. The budget also saved $126 billion by ending production of the DDG 1000 destroyer, C-17 Globemaster and F-22 Raptor.
Of the 42 programs GAO assessed, there has been “continued improvement in the technology, design, and manufacturing … at key points in the acquisition process.” But most programs are proceeding with less knowledge than best practices suggest, which puts them at higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays, the report said. A majority have experienced requirements changes, software development challenges and/or work force issues, which can affect program stability and execution.
DoD has begun to implement a revised acquisition policy, and GAO said the number of programs adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition should increase and the program outcomes should improve if DoD consistently applies this policy.
Among the findings:
• Newer programs are beginning with higher levels of technology maturity, but they are not taking key steps to ensure there is a match between requirements and resources.
• Programs that have held critical design reviews in recent years reported higher levels of design knowledge; however, few programs are demonstrating that the design is capable of meeting performance requirements by testing an integrated prototype.
• Some programs are taking steps to bring critical manufacturing processes into control; however, many programs still rely on “after the fact” metrics, such as defects and rework, to measure manufacturing process maturity.
• Programs are still not regularly testing production-representative prototypes before committing to production.
• More programs are using reliability growth curves before beginning production.
• A majority of programs changed key systems requirements after development start.
• Many programs are at risk for cost growth and schedule delays because of software development issues.
• Programs’ reliance on nongovernment personnel continues to increase in order to make up for shortfalls in government personnel and capabilities.
This is no surprise to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, who has been vocal about cutting production and life-cycle costs. In a recent interview with Navy Times, he said the fact that the Navy can add technology to a program doesn’t mean it needs to. Doing so will likely cause the service to sacrifice capability to enhance a weapon that already is well ahead of its adversaries, and will produce change orders that will result in cost overruns. Roughead pointed to the Joint High-Speed Vehicle as an example of keeping production costs under control and delays to a minimum.
“This is like a basic Ford pick-up truck,” he said. “If you tell me you want an FM radio in it, I’m going to tell you ‘no, you don’t get an FM radio.’ You may be able to add one later, but right now we need that JHSV out there doing its primary job.”
Read the GAO report:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/03/navy_gaoreport_033110w/
By Lance M. Bacon - Staff writer
Posted : Thursday Apr 1, 2010 10:59:10 EDT
The Government Accountability Office on Tuesday said the Defense Department’s weapon acquisition programs are improving, but remain in danger of cost overruns and delays.
The eighth annual report, titled “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,” examines how well DoD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs. It uses as a backdrop the defense secretary’s fiscal 2010 budget, which recommended canceling or curtailing several programs that were over cost, behind schedule or no longer suited to meet the warfighters’ needs. Such programs included the Air Force’s Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, the Army’s Future Combat System, the Missile Defense Agency’s Multiple Kill Vehicle and the Navy Deoartment’s VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement. The budget also saved $126 billion by ending production of the DDG 1000 destroyer, C-17 Globemaster and F-22 Raptor.
Of the 42 programs GAO assessed, there has been “continued improvement in the technology, design, and manufacturing … at key points in the acquisition process.” But most programs are proceeding with less knowledge than best practices suggest, which puts them at higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays, the report said. A majority have experienced requirements changes, software development challenges and/or work force issues, which can affect program stability and execution.
DoD has begun to implement a revised acquisition policy, and GAO said the number of programs adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition should increase and the program outcomes should improve if DoD consistently applies this policy.
Among the findings:
• Newer programs are beginning with higher levels of technology maturity, but they are not taking key steps to ensure there is a match between requirements and resources.
• Programs that have held critical design reviews in recent years reported higher levels of design knowledge; however, few programs are demonstrating that the design is capable of meeting performance requirements by testing an integrated prototype.
• Some programs are taking steps to bring critical manufacturing processes into control; however, many programs still rely on “after the fact” metrics, such as defects and rework, to measure manufacturing process maturity.
• Programs are still not regularly testing production-representative prototypes before committing to production.
• More programs are using reliability growth curves before beginning production.
• A majority of programs changed key systems requirements after development start.
• Many programs are at risk for cost growth and schedule delays because of software development issues.
• Programs’ reliance on nongovernment personnel continues to increase in order to make up for shortfalls in government personnel and capabilities.
This is no surprise to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, who has been vocal about cutting production and life-cycle costs. In a recent interview with Navy Times, he said the fact that the Navy can add technology to a program doesn’t mean it needs to. Doing so will likely cause the service to sacrifice capability to enhance a weapon that already is well ahead of its adversaries, and will produce change orders that will result in cost overruns. Roughead pointed to the Joint High-Speed Vehicle as an example of keeping production costs under control and delays to a minimum.
“This is like a basic Ford pick-up truck,” he said. “If you tell me you want an FM radio in it, I’m going to tell you ‘no, you don’t get an FM radio.’ You may be able to add one later, but right now we need that JHSV out there doing its primary job.”
Read the GAO report:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/03/navy_gaoreport_033110w/