bobdina
10-03-2009, 07:15 PM
Defense review could decide future of the Marine Corps
By Vago Muradian
vmuradian@militarytimes.com
The Marine Corps is fighting for the future of Afghanistan overseas, but back at home, officials are waging a battle for the Corps’ future in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Virtually everything important to the service’s future is up for grabs, from its core amphibious assault missions to its vehicle, ship and aircraft programs, current and former Marines say. And it’s all happening as the Pentagon responds to intense budget pressure that has already forced the cancellation of several high-profile weapons programs belonging to its sister services. Perhaps no program is bigger — or more controversial — than its $14 billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a tank-sized amphibian Marine leaders see as essential to preserving its core amphibious assault mission.
Long-delayed, overweight and vulnerable to roadside bombs, EFV is viewed by some as a symbol of ineffective program development.
But Pentagon, Navy and Marine sources said it’s too early to pass judgment on the program. To Marines Corps leadership, canceling EFV would undermine the service’s signature amphibious assault mission, cemented into place during World War II. Without it, the service starts looking to some like a second Army.
How much capability the Corps will be left with following the review is the most important issue at play, according to some, including retired Marine Gen. Bob Magnus, a former assistant commandant.
But even within the Corps, there are a range of views about the future of the service.
Some fear giving up so-called forced entry operations — landing on opposed beaches — because losing such unique capabilities weakens the service and would be difficult to reconstitute.
Others, however, maintain that as an amphibious expeditionary force, even without assault capability, the Marines would remain potent and agile with broad application across the conflict spectrum. In fact, some maintain that killing EFV would allow for increased investment in a range of new systems that could make the force more effective in both regular and irregular conflicts.
EFV’s critics argue the service has not performed an opposed amphibious operation since its massive 1950 landing at Inchon, Korea. Increasingly sophisticated, precise and available weapons are pushing naval forces farther out to sea, complicating amphibious landings, especially those facing enemy fire. But advocates counter that EFV’s 25-knot speed closes the growing ship-to-shore gap rapidly enough to operate effectively on contested beachheads.
“Thinking about this capability in terms of Inchon is all wrong,” Magnus said. “The question is what capabilities does the commander in chief and the nation need to project power from the sea to the shore. Amphibious assault is a small part of it because most of the time these are the same forces who are engaging with friends and allies around the world, performing short-notice noncombatant evacuations or humanitarian relief.” Overall amphibious capability is already shrinking, however, as the Navy cuts ships from its long-range plan including out-year amphibious ship construction. The Navy maintains that 27 ships are enough for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and nine Marine Expeditionary Units, but the Marine contend they need 33 ships.
Marine aviation and EFV
Another issue under scrutiny is whether the Marines need their own strike fighters, a capability the service has staunchly defended over the decades.
While critics see potential savings by reducing tactical aircraft purchases, Marines counter that their air-ground integration is what allows their relatively small seaborne forces to pack a disproportionate punch.
The vertical takeoff and landing version of the F-35 Lightning II fighter is a top priority for the Corps, but that program is expected to be pruned over the coming years, also driving up unit costs.
The Corps’ most vulnerable program, however, remains the EFV, which has been in development for some 20 years. The Marines have slashed their planned buy of EFVs by nearly half, to 573. Now, further reductions are inevitable even if it survives the coming needs-based review.
Despite a redesign last year, EFV still suffers reliability problems that will delay production until 2014.
One analyst said recent improvements to the vehicle may still give the program a chance.
“This is a tough challenge, to build a fast-moving amphibious combat vessel,” said Daniel Gouré of the Lexington Institute, an Arlington, Va.-based think tank. “We’ve never been able to design something which can move fast on land and in water. This is a real combat vehicle that will get to the shore and go immediately into combat. Overall, the product is pretty good.
MARINE CORPS TIMES
By Vago Muradian
vmuradian@militarytimes.com
The Marine Corps is fighting for the future of Afghanistan overseas, but back at home, officials are waging a battle for the Corps’ future in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Virtually everything important to the service’s future is up for grabs, from its core amphibious assault missions to its vehicle, ship and aircraft programs, current and former Marines say. And it’s all happening as the Pentagon responds to intense budget pressure that has already forced the cancellation of several high-profile weapons programs belonging to its sister services. Perhaps no program is bigger — or more controversial — than its $14 billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a tank-sized amphibian Marine leaders see as essential to preserving its core amphibious assault mission.
Long-delayed, overweight and vulnerable to roadside bombs, EFV is viewed by some as a symbol of ineffective program development.
But Pentagon, Navy and Marine sources said it’s too early to pass judgment on the program. To Marines Corps leadership, canceling EFV would undermine the service’s signature amphibious assault mission, cemented into place during World War II. Without it, the service starts looking to some like a second Army.
How much capability the Corps will be left with following the review is the most important issue at play, according to some, including retired Marine Gen. Bob Magnus, a former assistant commandant.
But even within the Corps, there are a range of views about the future of the service.
Some fear giving up so-called forced entry operations — landing on opposed beaches — because losing such unique capabilities weakens the service and would be difficult to reconstitute.
Others, however, maintain that as an amphibious expeditionary force, even without assault capability, the Marines would remain potent and agile with broad application across the conflict spectrum. In fact, some maintain that killing EFV would allow for increased investment in a range of new systems that could make the force more effective in both regular and irregular conflicts.
EFV’s critics argue the service has not performed an opposed amphibious operation since its massive 1950 landing at Inchon, Korea. Increasingly sophisticated, precise and available weapons are pushing naval forces farther out to sea, complicating amphibious landings, especially those facing enemy fire. But advocates counter that EFV’s 25-knot speed closes the growing ship-to-shore gap rapidly enough to operate effectively on contested beachheads.
“Thinking about this capability in terms of Inchon is all wrong,” Magnus said. “The question is what capabilities does the commander in chief and the nation need to project power from the sea to the shore. Amphibious assault is a small part of it because most of the time these are the same forces who are engaging with friends and allies around the world, performing short-notice noncombatant evacuations or humanitarian relief.” Overall amphibious capability is already shrinking, however, as the Navy cuts ships from its long-range plan including out-year amphibious ship construction. The Navy maintains that 27 ships are enough for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and nine Marine Expeditionary Units, but the Marine contend they need 33 ships.
Marine aviation and EFV
Another issue under scrutiny is whether the Marines need their own strike fighters, a capability the service has staunchly defended over the decades.
While critics see potential savings by reducing tactical aircraft purchases, Marines counter that their air-ground integration is what allows their relatively small seaborne forces to pack a disproportionate punch.
The vertical takeoff and landing version of the F-35 Lightning II fighter is a top priority for the Corps, but that program is expected to be pruned over the coming years, also driving up unit costs.
The Corps’ most vulnerable program, however, remains the EFV, which has been in development for some 20 years. The Marines have slashed their planned buy of EFVs by nearly half, to 573. Now, further reductions are inevitable even if it survives the coming needs-based review.
Despite a redesign last year, EFV still suffers reliability problems that will delay production until 2014.
One analyst said recent improvements to the vehicle may still give the program a chance.
“This is a tough challenge, to build a fast-moving amphibious combat vessel,” said Daniel Gouré of the Lexington Institute, an Arlington, Va.-based think tank. “We’ve never been able to design something which can move fast on land and in water. This is a real combat vehicle that will get to the shore and go immediately into combat. Overall, the product is pretty good.
MARINE CORPS TIMES