Attacking Dismounted Infantry With Armored Cavalry Pt. I

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In 1986, I went to the armory to prepare for a weekend drill. I went to my platoon box to gather what may have been placed there by the Training NCO. As I gazed into the box, an Armor magazine (September-October 1986) quickly caught my attention. There, on the cover page was a drawing of a NVA Soldier preparing to fire upon a Sheridan or ACAV with a RPG. What really had my attention riveted to the cover page was the bumper number on the front slope of the Sheridan, C-37, and on the other side of the front slope was, 11 ACR (my Troop and Unit while I was in Vietnam, C-Trp, 1/11th ACR). I quickly opened the magazine to the Table of Contents and found the article. That article follows in five parts.

"VIETNAM: 6 September, 1969

Attacking Dismounted Infantry With Armored Cavalry

by Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen (USA, Ret.)
Colonel Arthur L. West III (USA, Ret.) and
Lieutenant Colonel (P) Douglas H. Starr

An attack on dismounted infantry in the open by any armored force is, at worst, a meat-grinding operation. This article is based on the reflections of three commanders concerning just such an action in the Republic of Vietnam. It concerns the combat actions of the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, on 6 September, 1969, about three and a half kilometers west of the village of Loc Ninh, a small district capital in the rubber plantation area to the north of the provincial capital of An Loc. The lessons learned by the commanders in this action, in many instances, are not new, but bear repeating.

The terrain in the area of the fight was a fully developed rubber plantation with unpaved roads throughout. The enemy situation was, as normal, spotty with no specific enemy locations known. From previous actions and captured documents, the 209th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment was identified in the general area of Loc Ninh. During the past two months, the squadron had had continuous contacts in the area.

The squadron was task organized for this day's operation as follows:

A Troop (-) (CPT Palmer) Detached to BUDOP
Special Forces Detachment

Team C (CPT West) C Troop
2 Companies CIDG

Team PAPA (CPT Poindexter) HHT ACAV section
Surveillance section
Flamethrower ("Zippo") section
1st Plt. 919th Armd Eng Co
M551 Plt (Prov), A Troop

B Troop (CPT Starr)

Co D (CPT Kramer)

SQDN CON HHT (-) How Btry
Avn Sec

Here, in their own words, three of the commanders tell the story of the Loc Ninh Action of 6 September, 1969.

Setting the Scene

MAJ Bahnsen:

B Troop and Team C were given an area reconnaissance mission west and northeast of Loc Ninh respectively. Company D was given a maintenance day to repair its 11 downed M 48 tanks, but was told to be prepared for possible reinforcement of B Troop or Team C with all ***ets available. Team PAPA was given a convoy escort mission to An Loc, 25 km to the south. One UH-1 and one OH-6 were on standby at the squadron CP. At approximately 0938 hours, B Troop (CPT Douglas Starr) reported contact with an enemy force estimated to be at least company size. I immediately got airborne and flew to the area. Within minutes, howitzer battery (CPT Ed Plymale) placed artillery fire to the west of B Troop. I adjusted the fire to block the enemy's withdrawal. A pink team (one OH-6 and one AH-1G) from the 11th Cavalry's Air Cavalry Troop was placed under my operational control at this time, and at least one team remained on station throughout the day.

CPT Starr:

Having received the reconnaissance mission for the next day from MAJ Bahnsen, I left the squadron CP for my ACAV and the two escort tracks I had with me to ooze the short distance back to my troop CP on the mud-inundated roads. As I ate supper, I thought of how best to perform the reconnaissance, in view of recent severe rains causing extremely muddy conditions in the ***igned area.

At my platoon leaders' briefing that evening I outlined the next day's mission, which included a troop-size reconnaissance in force, using pinwheel movements, in the southern half of the rubber (plantation). I put special emphasis on thorough reconnaissance and more than-usual caution in any type of possible ambush site. The pinwheel movements were designed to best cover the rubber and yet avoid crossing most of the creeks and depressions. The special emphasis was precipitated by a series of reports my troop CP had been receiving since just before supper indicating large troop movements into our sector during the last six to twelve hours. It was to prove to be most worthwhile special emphasis.

The sun shone warmly as the troop splashed through the small village of Loc Ninh and entered the rubber at approximately 0845. It had been a quite night with even the enemy reports of the previous day tapering off and finally ending about midnight. The village children and the rubber workers were out in force and waving happily. All was peaceful, and the war seemed a long way off.

Approximately 300 meters into the rubber I gave the order to veer left off the road and ***ume what I called our "Rubber Formation"-a five-vehicle-front, rectangular-shaped formation designed for terrain that allowed reasonably good vision. The platoons moved into position. I noted to my satisfaction that, despite the rare sunny morning and the friendly greetings in the village, the troops were alert. This alertness was within minutes of saving the troop's life....

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Contact at Hill 203

As we moved through the rubber, we paralleled a deep ravine to our left and bore left with it as it turned from northwest to southwest toward the areas of the rubber seldom worked by the Vietnamese rubber workers. We were approaching Hill 203, paralleling the road on our right, when my First Platoon leader, LT Steven Vince, informed me his left flank security had detected possible movement to our left front. We had been in this rubber often before, and, while unusual, workers in this area were a possibility. I gave the order to bear left, increase speed, and hold fire. After moving about 50 meters my Second Platoon Leader, LT Harry Hardin, in a voice that was calm but unmistakably concerned, reported his flank security had definite movement on the high ground now to our right flank. I immediately gave the order to turn right and ordered LT Vince to keep a sharp watch for the suspected movement he had originally reported. As we approached Hill 203 from the SE, we engaged three brown-clad individuals running at a crouch across our front on the high ground. As I gave the order to come on line and move up the hill, the thunderous din of enemy fire from the entire m*** of high ground to our front quickly told me that we were engaged with an enemy force of at least company size and, judging from the number of automatic weapons, probably of battalion size or more. Quickly reporting to MAJ Bahnsen, I fully deployed the troop and began moving as quickly as possible toward the high ground. I was hindered slightly by the muddy ground and by the fact that two of my three platoon leaders had their antennae shot off and were attempting to correct that while continuing to move and direct their platoons. MAJ Bahnsen was enroute and the howitzer battery had begun blocking fires on the far side of Hill 203.

About one-third of the way up the hill, a freakish RPG round entered the coax aperture of an M551 Sheridan at the center of our formation, causing a flash fire in the turret. Several other casualties had occured on other tracks and medics were kept busy consolidating the wounded at the medic track in the center of our formation, which at this point consisted of two platoons on line (1st and 2nd) with LT Leroy deWitt's 3rd platoon providing rear and flank security. Informing MAJ Bahnsen of the serious nature of my casualties and my estimations of the size of the enemy force (approximately battalion size), I was instructed to evacuate my casualties to an LZ where a medevac could get them out. I also monitered MAJ Bahnsen's orders to C Troop and D Company to join the fracas.

MAJ Bahnsen:

Upon report of the battalion-size contact, I immediately ordered Company D and C Troop (previously alerted) to move to the firefight. MAJ Bill Good, the squadron S3, called medevac and again verified the status of 155-mm ammunition. I gave howitzer battery a fire mission calling for a WP marking round on the western edge of the rubber and instructed the fire direction center (FDC) to stay on the squadron command frequency. The firefight was only a short distance from the CP, and I was over the area in short order, getting an idea of the lineup. D Company and C Troop were on the move at this time.

CPT Starr:

We were still moving up the hill well, despite increasingly heavy fire from the top. I detached my medic track and four 3rd platoon vehicles under LT deWitt's command and sent them back toward Loc Ninh with the wounded. As LT deWitt got about five hundred meters behind my rear security, they came under intense fire and had to return. Again, I thought of the original movement we had had, but could do nothing then but inform MAJ Bahnsen and CPTs West and Kramer of the new development.

As D Company arrived, they took up a position on my left flank, and C Troop closely followed them on my right flank. With the arrival of D Company, I again deployed the evacuation element, this time with the entire 3rd platoon, to Loc Ninh for medevac. LT deWitt encountered heavy resistance again about 5-700 meters to our rear, but was able to break out without futher casualties and returned to Loc Ninh where the medevac was accomplished without incident. I ordered LT deWitt not to attempt to rejoin the troop at that time but to remain in position.

MAJ Bahnsen:

During successive p***es over the western edge of the rubber plantation, I received heavy AA fire. All helicopters coming into the area were warned about this fire, but in spite of this, three helicopters were hit during course of the day. D Company moved at high speed to join B Troop, but they overshot the area and had to be led back to B Troop's location. This is typical of most linkups in a fast moving firefight. This was also CPT Kramer's first contact as a company commanding officer....

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C Troop Joins the Fight

CPT West:

On the morning of 6 September, 1969, C Troop was located at its night defensive perimeter (NDP), approximately 8 km NE of Loc Ninh. The troop was scheduled to conduct a Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) to the east of its NDP, but had received permission to delay its departure in order to accomplish some much- needed maintenance. For the past several days, the troop had been conducting joint operations with two composite companies of Cambodian Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops from the Loc Ninh Special Forces camp. There were two U.S. advisors with the CIDG companies-SSG Stang and the team sergeant, an SFC whose name I do not remember. (In the past, it had been my policy to allow the Cambodians to turn in all captured weapons through Special Forces channels since they were paid for these weapons. After a number of successful-and for the Cambodians, profitable-operations, the troop never lacked for more than enough aggressive volunteers for joint operations.)

Prior to 1000, the troop was notified that B Troop was in a firefight west of Loc Ninh and was alerted for a possible reinforcing mission. I alerted the Special Forces advisors and my platoon leaders-LT Bob Wiseman, 1st Platoon; SSG Bill Bathe, 2nd Platoon; and LT Paul Baerman, 3rd Platoon-of the possibility of having to go to the B Troop contact. I decided to leave 1SG Bill Chambers in charge of the NDP. He was to have the following vehicles: two Sheridans, (one was a combat loss, the other had sustained major combat damage) a borrowed light recovery vehicle, three mortar tracks, an M113 AVLB, and two troop headquarters ACAVs.

At approximately 1000, the troop was ordered to move to the B Troop contact. It left the NDP with one Sheridan (a 3rd Platoon track) and 15 ACAVs with the two CIDG companies on board. The status of the six Sheridans remaining on the TOE was as follows: two Sheridans were down for combat damage and four were down for engines which gave out "busting jungle" outside the rubber.

The distance from the NDP to the contact area was 14 km. As the troop p***ed through Loc Ninh, it received word that contact had been broken and B Troop had taken casualties and had a vehicle knocked out. After p***ing through local PF troops gaurding rubber workers, the troop went into its combat formation, which was similar to B Troop's rubber formation. At this time C Troop was approximately one kilometer from B Troop's location. The troop approached the contact area from the NE and stopped when it was 75 meters short of the B Troop vehicles. I placed the troop in a laager. The CIDG forces were instructed to remain inside the laager. (I did not want my forces intermixing with those of B Troop). LT Paul Baerman was left in command as SSG Stang, a VN Special Forces type, 2-4 Cambodians, my right gunner SP4 Larry Boobar with a radio, and I walked down the hill to confer with the B Troop CO, CPT Doug Starr. CPT Starr filled me in on the results of his contact with the enemy. He stated the enemy had broken contact and that he thought the area was clear. SSG Stang and those with him went to help interrogate one of the POWs. I suggested that the Cambodians sweep the area of contact.

I then noticed that the Sheridan and a few ACAVs had broken out of the laager and were moving down toward B Troop. SP4 Boobar received word on the radio that some movement had been detected in some ditches between the laager and B Troop. I gave instruction for the remaining vehicles to hold fast, for those vehicles advancing to be careful with their .50-cals since B Troop was all around, and for my track to join us.

I angled through the rubber to intercept the advancing tracks. I did not realize that SP Boobar had run back to the command track instead of following me. I yelled to SSG Stang as I moved p*** a gutted B Troop Sheridan. Then all hell broke loose around me. The next five minutes was sheer chaos-AK-47 fire, RPGs, machine gun fire, grenades-both theirs and ours, and pistol fire. The memories are blurred: I remember having to reload my pistol (the only weapon I had) many times; an NVA broke and ran and everyone, NVA included, shot at him until he fell; shouting at tracks to try to prevent shooting into B Troop's men; and RPG boosters strapped on the back of the NVA being set on fire by tracers.

In five minutes it was over. Twenty-three enemy had been killed within 50-100 meters of where I had been talking to the B Troop CO. This was done without wounding any man from B Troop. But it was not without a price. SP5 James Gray, who was acting as the loader on the Sheridan. had been killed by an RPG treeburst. The same burst had severly wounded the Sheridan's TC, SSG Jesse Crowe, platoon sergeant of the 3rd Platoon. I didn't discover this until some time later and had to order SSG Crowe to the medic track. The team sergeant from the Special Forces camp had been wounded, along with several Cambodians.

At this time I ordered SP4 Barry Beaven, the senior troop medic, to take the wounded back to the squadron FSB. I detailed the 1st Platoon Sergeant, PSG Bill McQuire, to take two ACAVs and escort the medic track....

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Sweeping the Area

The Squadron Commander then ordered the squadron to go on line and sweep to the SE. From left to right it was C, B, D. The CIDG companies were spread out behind the tracks to protect the left flank (and the high ground).

MAJ Bahnsen was forced to leave the area for fule, and as senior troop commander, I was placed in temporary command of thr ground forces. (This was squadron SOP unless the S3 or an ***istant S3 was in the air overhead.) The sweep moved slowly while the howitzer battery continued to seal the area to the south with 155-mm fire. (Because of the vagaries of radio communication in the rubber, my interim troop CP track, C2, located 14 km away, had to function as a radio relay to squadron several times.) A short, sharp, contact developed at the junction between B Troop and D Company. CPT Starr reported that documents found on individuals killed confirmed that this was a battalion-size ambush. The squadron on line continued its sweep for about 800 meters, to the vicinity of a north-south road. The squadron (-) then reversed itself and reswept the contact area while the Cambodians performed a more detailed search of the area.

CPT Starr:

The troop had reached the crest of the hill, C Troop and D Company were in position, and we had four prisoners that my ex-NVA Tiger Scout was questioning.

MAJ Bahnsen ordered that the three units reverse direction and move back down the hill toward my original suspected movement and toward the element that had made evacuation of the wounded so difficult. As the three units moved on line back down the hill all three came into contact with the headquarters element of the original ambush and a large portion of the ambush force which had managed to extricate itself and rejoin the command group.

The indescribable awe of the two cavalry troops and one tank company fully deployed on line and committed can perhaps best be described by depicting the captured NVA soldier I had on my track whose eyes reflected a curious mixture of terror, awe, sympathy for his comrades, and relief at being where he was instead of where they were.

Encountering moderately heavy contact most of the way, the three units made a semicircular sweep of about three kilometers during which it began to rain heavily. During this sweep the CIDG companies attached to C Troop dismounted and moved behind and between tracks to search the dead and to prevent anyone popping up behind the skirmish line and in front of the rear security. Their actions were a great contribution and led to the capture of a number of important documents, maps, etc. as well as to the knowledge that we had killed the entire command section of the K9 Battalion, 209th NVA Regiment. (The bodies of this command group were moved to the rear for intelligence purposes; i.e., identification.) Late in the afternoon, after resweeping the entire contact area and encountering no contact at all, MAJ Bahnsen gave the order for all three units to move toward a large clearing southwest of the original contact area on Hill 203.

CPT West:

After delievering the wounded to the FSB, PSG McQuire and SP4 Beaven were returning with their three tracks when they reported that the PF troops guarding the rubber workers west of Loc Ninh had one man wounded while killing one NVA and driving off some others. Beavens requested permission to take the wounded man back to Loc Ninh. Since there had been no enemy contact for some time, I gave him permission.

At this time, I received instruction from MAJ Bahnsen to move to a large clearing SW of the contact area for resupply and evacuation of the POWs. I informed him that the cleared portion of the area was mined. C Troop had lost its old C2 vehicle there two or three weeks earlier during a resupply mission. However, the far end of the clearing was covered by thick brush which could be pushed down to make an LZ. The B Troop and D Company COs were reminded about the mined area.

The CIDG remounted the C Troop tracks and some of B Troops vehicles. The order of march toward the LZ was C, B, D. C Troop moved out with the Sheridan leading followed by the command track, 2nd Platoon, 3rd Platoon, and 1st Platoon. PSG McQuire with two 1st Platoon ACAVs and the medic track rejoined the troop at the tail of the formation....

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Contact Regained

The troop moved down the western edge of the clearing and was nearing the far edge, when the lead and only C Troop Sheridan (now commanded by SP4 Mel LaFranchi) reported two men had run across the road in the rubber from right to left. I told LaFranchi to shoot at the SOBs. From my position behind the left machine gun in the trailing command track, I also saw the men, but did not fire at them because most side gunners have a tendency to shoot off the antenna when they attempt to fire straight ahead. I ordered the troop to deploy right and the Cambodians to dismount. The Sheridan roared ahead and veered off the road to the right when it reached the edge of the clearing. The command track was on its right. The ACAV following me moved up and protected the Sheridan's left flank. About 15 seconds later and 20 meters into the rubber, there was an explosion directly to the right of my command ACAV, mortally wounding SP4 Boobar, the right gunner. The radio control box had been damaged, so that I lost communication. I climbed up from the floor to yell at the TC, SP4 Vernon Stahl. But when I pulled myself up to the rear of the cupola, I found Stahl unconcious from a wound in the back of his neck. Flak jackets had prevented my crew from being killed instantly. The driver, SP4 Robert Ferrar, completely oblivious that the rest of the crew was out of action continued to move ahead in formation. I finally managed to convey to him to stop and back up. With a damaged commo system, I attempted to inform Squadron that I had been hit and to order LT Baerman forward to take command.

The first man to reach the track was SP4 Beaven. He administered aid to the dying Boobar and unconscious Stahl before stretcher bearers moved them away. LT Baerman arrived soon after. I told him he was in command and tried to tell him what the situation was. He moved off in the command ACAV with the troop interpreter as his third crew member. SGT (E5) Earl Sizemore was now the 3rd Platoon leader. (It was a policy in the troop to occasionally switch positions with the troop and the platoons. This was not the first time LT Baerman had acted as troop CO or Sizemore as platoon leader.)

As I was led back to the medic track, I p***ed a 2nd Platoon ACAV that had received a direct hit, killing the TC, SSG Wayne Saunders, and wounding the crew. Apparently the few surviving elements of K9 Battalion had cross our trail again as they continued to withdraw towards the jungle to the west of the rubber.

CPT Starr:

Enroute to the clearing, with C Troop leading, my troop second, and D Company bringing up the rear, I heard heavy firing in the direction of C Troop and was unable to raise anyone from C Troop on the squadron command net. Again deploying the troop on line, I moved it into C Troop's formation and on line amongst them. During this movement, one Sheridan from my troop and one tank from D Company hit mines, thus necessitating a hasty minesweep of the immediate surrounding area. Just as I got the formation straightened out, I informed the D Company commander of B and C Troops' deployment, and informed MAJ Bahnsen of the new situation. LT Baerman, second in command in C Troop, entered the squadron net, informing us of CPT West's track being hit and CPT West being wounded, and requested instructions. No contact was being made and due to the terrain no futher movement could be made to the west or southwest. MAJ Bahnsen ordered all three units to enter the clearing where the squadron would consolidate, evacuate the prisoners, and be given futher orders (roadmarch back to our night defensive positions).

After all three units had entered and secured the clearing and the prisoners had been evacuated, MAJ Bahnsen briefed the unit commanders on the movement back to the airstrip to Loc Ninh and our deployment that night. The squadron began to move back to Loc Ninh at about 1730 after being in sporatic heavy contact since approximately 0940. The movement back was without incident despite the difficulty encountered in evacuating the disabled vehicles through the heavy mud, made even worse by the steady rain.

B Troop had two Sheridans damaged, approxmately nine WIA, and no KIA. It had captured four NVA prisoners and made its contribution to the 74 NVA confirmed killed that day by the squadron.

MAJ Bahnsen:

Earlier my S3 had finally established contact with Team PAPA (Command ACAVs and A Troop's M551s) and directed them to the contact area. Flying weather at this time was marginal with light rain and fog; however, my helicopter crew took the POWs and wounded back to the CP in several sorties. It was not until this time that I was able to get on the ground and direct the units. Although control and communications are normally much better in the air, the morale aspect of having the CO on the ground always outweigh these factors. My use of Team PAPA as an economy of force in escorting a convoy left me without my ground command section, and on this particular day was a bad decision on my part. On the other hand, had I used either B or C Troop on the escort mission, we might have been shorthanded with a large enemy force. It was my normal policy to p*** command to my S3 when I had to refule, or-as in this action-to the senior commander on the ground if the S3 could not get airborne.

Movement back to the CP area was uneventful except for trouble in evacuating several damaged vehicles.

Uncounted acts of heroism were performed on this date-CPT West, CPT Starr, and several others received Silver Stars for gallantry in action. CPT West's shootout with an NVA officer near the ditch only 25 meters from B Troop's burning Sheridan was only part of the personal nature of the fight. Seventy-four NVA were killed by actual body count and four NVA prisoners were taken. Three troopers from C Troop were killed in action and 36 men were wounded in action. The NVA prisoners confirmed that we had killed most of the leaders of the NVA battalion. POWs also confirmed the NVA unit as the K9 Battalion of the 209th Regiment.

Reflections on a contact of this type are numerous, and I will list only a few:

1) B Troop's alertness and quickness of action in the initial stages of the contact on Hill 203 were instrumental in fixing the enemy.

2) C Troop's and D Company's aggressive execution of the Blackhorse's "Pile-On" principle in moving to the contact proved valid again.

3) The howitzer battery's and the Air Cavalry Troop's excellent support throughout a long day reinforce the knowledge that we need a variety of firepower on the battlefield.

4) LT Baerman's rapid and smooth ***umption of command of C Troop when CPT West was wounded shows the results of junior officers being trained in the next higher job.

5) The fine support provided by the CIDG companies attached to the Squadron again proved invaluable

6) Having trained commanders at all levels ready to ***ume command when needed reflected well on the policy of rotating commanders and staff into different slots.

7) The battle area must be thoroughly searched. Just because the enemy stops shooting does not mean the fight is over, as C and B Troops found out while the COs were
dismounted.

8) Even with prior knowledge and a definite warning, tracks can be destroyed by old minefields, as in the case of D Company and B Troop in the clearing.

9) Howitzer batteries under a squadron commander's direct control can be "used" more quickly and in general, can provide better, more responsive fire support.

10) Command from a helicopter gives better communications and usually better visibility and control, but does not normally outweight the morale aspects of sharing the ground troopers' hazards under fire once the enemy has been fixed and his destruction starts.

11) Link-up in a firefight is normally difficult, and even when done with caution as demonstrated by CPT Starr and CPT West the unforeseen happens. CPT Kramer's moving p*** B Troop's position could have been a problem had the fight still been in progress at the time.

Even with mixups and a mobile situation, attack of dismounted infantry with armor forces is a slaughter. RPG teams and brave machine gunners die beside their comrades, and only the lucky shot and the flaming track can give solace to an infantry commander as his unit is usually decimated."

[bobdina]

Thanks good read